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Introduction
After the global economy had suffered the harshest reces-
sion of approximately the last sixty years, signs of recov-
ery have multiplied in the course of 2009. Business and 
consumer confidence has picked up significantly since the 
spring, while industrial production and international trade 
– the two aspects which had suffered the most marked 
decline at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 – have 
stabilised or risen slightly in the main economic regions.
This revival of activity, borne along by the twin factors of 
economic policy measures and more technical factors, has 
appeared a little earlier than expected. While the financial 
crisis had strongly aggravated the slowdown in business 
activity, fears of a collapse in the financial system abated 
in  the  course  of  2009  as  the  determined  and  massive 
action  of  monetary  authorities  and  governments  took 
effect. These fears gradually gave way to a renewed appe-
tite for risk in the positioning of investors. Central banks 
also maintained their key rates at very low levels in the 
context of weak inflationary pressure. Furthermore, stim-
ulus-oriented budget plans implemented in the majority 
of  the  advanced  economies,  but  also  in  the  emerging 
countries, gave a far-reaching impetus to the economy. 
Apart from this, the generalised running-down of inven-
tories – which was a clear sign of the search for liquidity 
among firms after the financial crisis intensified, parallel-
ing that pursued by the financial institutions – appears to 
be coming to an end.
It is now thought that, in general, GDP resumed a growth 
path from the third quarter of 2009, whereas six months 
ago, the first phase of recovery was only forecast to arrive 
in  the  course  of  2010.  However,  there  are  still  serious 
doubts as to whether the upturn will last beyond the next 
two  quarters,  since  the  impetus  from  economic  policy 
should tail off and the contribution to growth connected 
to  movements  in  inventories  is  temporary  by  nature. 
Over and above this, firms and private individuals in the 
advanced  economies,  and  more  particularly  in  Europe, 
must adapt themselves to the substantial fall in the level 
of activity and incomes. These adjustments are expected 
to  continue  to  weigh  on  investment,  employment  and 
consumer spending for some time.
This is the setting – better than in the spring but nonethe-
less still very uncertain – in which the updates to the mac-
roeconomic projections for 2009 and 2010, carried out as 
part of the six-monthly exercise for the Eurosystem, are 
taking place. The results for the whole area are published 
in the ECB’s Bulletin for December 2009 ; they indicate 
that GDP will increase in 2010, albeit at a modest pace, 
after plummeting by around 4 p.c. this year, while infla-
tion will remain low.
According  to  the  flash  estimate  from  the  NAI,  GDP  in 
Belgium  rose  by  0.5  p.c.  in  the  third  quarter  of  2009 
after showing a cumulative decline of more than 4 p.c. 
during the previous twelve months. This result confirms 
the expected improvement in short-term prospects and 
consequently the upward revision of growth projections 
compared to the results published in June  (1). This contrasts 
sharply with the very rapid and very substantial downward 
revisions made over the course of twelve months during 
successive economic forecasting exercises. On the other 
hand,  the  current  projections  still  include  a  substantial 
rise in unemployment and a considerable deficit in public 
finances, while inflation is expected to remain moderate.
(1)  The previous version of the economic projections for 2009 and 2010 was presented   
in more detail in the spring, in the Bank’s June 2009 Economic Review.8
































































CHART 1  DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS, BUSINESS CONFIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
  (monthly averages)
Sources : Bloomberg, CPB, HWWI, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
(1)  Fixed rate paid by the party receiving the overnight rate (Eonia for the euro area, actual federal funds rate for the US) in a three-month interest rate swap.
(2)  Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Broad index.
(3)  Wilshire 5000 index.
(4)  Topix index.
(5)  MSCI Emerging Markets Index.
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The  results  presented  briefly  in  this  article  incorporate 
the information available as at 20 November 2009. They 
were compiled on the basis of assumptions common to 
the Eurosystem, the principles of which are described in 
the box included in the first section. As is usual in the case 
of  public  finances,  these  projections  only  take  account 
of  measures  formally  approved  by  the  authorities,  par-
ticularly for the 2010-2011 federal budget and the 2010 
budgets of the Communities and Regions, on which suf-
ficient detail is available.
1.    International environment and 
assumptions
Paralysed by the distinct worsening of the financial crisis 
and other factors, international trade in goods collapsed 
by almost 20 p.c. at the end of 2008 and beginning of 
2009,  very  quickly  plunging  the  advanced  economies 
and  most  emerging  economies  into  a  generalised  and 
very  deep  recession.  In  the  second  quarter  of  2009, 
United States GDP expressed in real terms fell by 3.8 p.c. 9
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compared  to  the  corresponding  period  of  the  previous 
year. The decline reached 4.8 p.c. in the euro area and 
5.5  p.c.  in  the  United  Kingdom  respectively,  while  it 
amounted to 8.4 p.c. in Japan in the first quarter. While 
most economies suffered serious effects, therefore, the 
scale of the decrease in activity varied from one region to 
the next, depending on the importance of foreign trade 
(this having been the main channel through which the 
recession spread), exposure to the financial sector and, 
in some cases, the bursting of a bubble in the real estate 
sector.
From  the  second  half  of  2009  onwards,  however,  the 
unprecedented  measures  taken  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic to prevent a financial system meltdown and the 
extremely flexible monetary and budgetary policies quickly 
put into place in most economies began to produce their 
effects.
On  the  one  hand,  financial  tensions  gradually  eased 
under  the  combined  impact  of  government  guarantee 
mechanisms and injections of capital for the benefit of the 
financial institutions, and also generous grants of liquid-
ity which the central banks took steps to provide. On the 
money markets, the gap between unsecured interbank 
deposit rates and those for risk-free investments, which 
had  reached  a  peak  in  October  2008,  returned  to  a 
level comparable to that prevailing prior to the failure of 
Lehman Brothers. A similar decline in spreads was seen 
for corporate and government bonds, as investors began 
to  consider  moving  back  into  higher-risk  investments, 
whereas they had frantically sought security and liquidity 
at the height of the financial crisis. On the main stock 
markets, share prices similarly began an upward move-
ment ; in rebounding by around 50 p.c. with reference to 
their lowest point reached in the course of March 2009, 
they recovered 30 p.c. to 50 p.c. of the losses suffered 
during the crisis.
On the other hand, business confidence picked up, in 
some cases strongly, when it became apparent that the 
rapid fall in activity had ceased against a background 
where central banks had maintained their key rates at 
very low levels since the start of the year and where 
measures  taken  by  governments  were  on  a  massive 
scale.  These  stimulus  measures  took  various  forms  in 
the United States and Europe, notably the speeding-up 
of public investment, the easing of taxes and even a 
helping hand for private investment or the purchase of 
motor vehicles, the automobile sector having been hit 
particularly hard by the recession. Emerging countries 
also  implemented  measures  on  a  large  scale ;  spend-
ing  on  infrastructure  increased  strongly  in  China,  for 
instance.
With government support, rising demand helped to put 
an end to the process of running down inventories, which 
had been observed since the end of 2008. This develop-
ment contributed to a revival in international trade, mainly 
under the impetus of China and other Asian countries ; 
the recovery remains fragile, however, in the light of the 
scale of the drop which preceded it. Alongside these initial 
signs of strengthening demand, prices for raw materials 
on  the  international  markets  similarly  picked  up  from 
spring 2009 onwards. In particular, the price of a barrel 
of Brent crude oil, which had fallen from a maximum of 
around 145 US dollars in July 2008 to about 40 US dollars 
in December, rose once again to about 80 US dollars in 
mid-November 2009.
Overall, the trend in activity in 2009 is still mainly domi-
nated by the major recession which was rife at the end of 
2008 and beginning of 2009. According to the autumn 
forecasts from the EC, global GDP is predicted to decrease 
by 1.2 p.c. in volume terms as an annual average, which 
would  represent  the  first  generalised  contraction  in 
activity  since  the  Second  World  War.  Among  the  large 
economic areas, GDP is forecast to decline by 2.5 p.c. in 
the United States, 5.9 p.c. in Japan and 4.1 p.c. in the 
European  Union  as  a  whole ; only  China  and  India  are 
expected to maintain positive growth.
The improvement in the environment during the second 
part of 2009 would put the global economy in a better 
position  in  2010.  Consequently,  the  forecasts  point  to 
renewed positive growth in GDP in most areas. This is 
expected to remain limited, however, since the effects of 
factors at the root of the recovery underway are tempo-
rary in nature and set to tail off rapidly, while elements 
which should take over and stoke this recovery in a last-
ing manner are still fragile. Thus, there still seems to be a 
generous surplus of production capacity, which is directly 
damping  down  business  investment  and,  due  to  the 
anticip  ated  continuing  rising  unemployment,  consumer 
spending  too.  In  this  situation,  following  an  average 
decline of almost 13 p.c. in 2009, global trade is only 
expected to rise by a little over 3 p.c., a rate markedly 
down on that seen prior to the crisis. As for inflationary 
pressures, these are expected to remain limited.
By recording a rise in volume of 0.4 p.c., the euro area 
also returned to positive GDP growth in the third quarter 
of 2009, after five successive quarters of decline. As in 
the other advanced economies, this turnaround is based 
not only on strengthening foreign demand, notably that 
emanating from Asia, but largely on the effect of support 
measures announced by governments and on the cyclical 
movement in changes in stock levels. It has come earlier 
than previously anticipated so the updated projections for 10
the Eurosystem assume a less pronounced drop in GDP 
for 2009 than the exercise carried out last June and even 
the interim exercise by the ECB, the results of which were 
published at the beginning of September. According to 
the new projections, GDP in the euro area as a whole 
is  forecast  to  decline  at  a  rate  between  -4.1  p.c.  and 
-3.9  p.c.  in  2009.  The  improved  prospects  in  terms  of 
activity for the end of the year similarly give rise to an 
upward revision in the growth envisaged for 2010. This 
is forecast to remain limited, however, at a level between 
0.1 p.c. and 1.5 p.c.
The tentative nature of the recovery is due to the modest 
hardening  of  demand  both  outside  the  euro  area,  an 
issue  referred  to  above,  and  domestically.  In  particular, 
investment by firms should shrink further in 2010 as a 
result of low levels of production capacity utilisation and 
falling  profitability.  A  continuation  of  the  adjustments 
taking place in real estate markets in various countries in 
the euro area should also lead to a decline in investment 
in  housing.  And  the  rise  in  consumer  spending  would 
be damped down by the expected deterioration in the 
labour market. While extending certain measures aimed 
at reducing working hours within firms initially actually 
softened the impact of the recession on employment in 
some countries, the adjustment should continue in 2010, 
giving rise to further growth in unemployment.
Overall  inflation  in  consumer  prices,  for  its  part,  has 
been in negative territory since June 2009 in the euro 
area, as a result of major underlying effects linked to 
the fall in raw materials prices compared to the previous 
year. As the impact of these factors rapidly tails off, and 
even  reverses  under  the  effect  of  the  recent  oil  price 
Table  1	 Projections	for	the	main	economic	areas














World   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 –1.2 3.1
of which :
United States  . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 –2.5 2.2
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.7 –5.9 1.1
European Union  . . . . . . . . 0.8 –4.1 0.7
China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 8.7 9.6
India  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 5.7 6.4
Russia   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 –7.2 2.3
Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 –0.4 4.2
p.m.	World	imports	 . . . . . . . . .   3.4   –12.9   3.2
  inflation	 (1)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 –0.5 0.8
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –1.2 –0.4
European Union  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 1.0 1.3
  Unemployment	rate	 (2)
United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 9.2 10.1
Japan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 5.8 6.3
European Union  . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.0 9.1 10.3
Source : EC (autumn forecasts, November 2009).
(1)  Consumer price index.
(2)  Percentages of the labour force.
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Inflation (HICP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 0.3 / 0.3 0.9 / 1.7   4.5   0.0   1.6
GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 –4.1 / –3.9 0.1 / 1.5   0.8   –3.1   1.0
of which :
Private consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 –1.2 / –1.0 –0.2 / 0.8   1.0   –1.6   0.8
Public consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.2 / 3.0 0.5 / 1.7   3.3   2.2   1.1
Investment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.6 –11.3 / –10.5 –3.1 / –0.1   3.8   –4.1   –1.3
Exports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –14.5 / –12.5 0.6 / 5.6   1.4   –12.1   3.0
Imports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 –12.6 / –11.0 0.4 / 4.6   2.7   –11.5   2.7
Sources : ECB, NBB.
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Box  –  Eurosystem assumptions
The Eurosystem’s economic projections for the euro area and the Bank’s corresponding projections for Belgium 
are based on the following technical assumptions :
–    the interest rates are based on market expectations. As an annual average, the three-month interbank 
deposit rate is forecast to fall from 4.6 p.c. in 2008 to 1.2 p.c. in 2009 and 2010. The yield on ten-year 
Belgian government bonds is projected at 4.4 p.c. in 2008, 3.9 p.c. in 2009 and 4 p.c. in 2010. As noted 
above, after widening markedly during the financial crisis, the spreads between these reference yields 
and those applicable to firms and households generally fell back to a level comparable to that applying 
previsously ;
–    bilateral  euro  exchange  rates  are  kept  constant  at  the  level  reached  in  mid-November  2009,  namely 
1.49 US dollar to the euro. This represents a gain of almost 7 p.c. compared to the average level in 2009 ;
–    in accordance with the movement in implicit prices reflected in forward contracts, international market 
prices for a barrel of Brent crude oil are expected to average 62.2 dollars in 2009 and 81.4 dollars in 2010, 
against 97.7 dollars in 2008 ;
–    relevant export markets for Belgium, measured as the weighted total of imports of the trading partners, 
including those in the euro area, are only likely to rise by 3.6 p.c. in 2010, after falling almost 11 p.c. in 
2009. Given this background, and in view of the appreciation of the euro, prices among competitors on 
export markets are projected to decrease by 3.7 p.c. in 2009 and 0.6 p.c. in 2010 ;
–    as is usual according to the Eurosystem conventions, the figures for public finances take account of the 
macroeconomic environment and budget measures which have already been announced and have been 





























































ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT IN OIL PRICES AND INTEREST RATES
Source : ECB.
(1)  Actual figures up to October 2009, assumption from November 2009.
(2)  Actual figures up to the third quarter of 2009, assumption from the fourth quarter of 2009.
In US dollar
CRUDE OIL PRICE (1)
(monthly averages, barrel of Brent)
In euro Three-month interbank rates in euro
INTEREST RATES (2)
(quarterly averages)
Ten-year yield on Belgian bonds
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increase on international markets, inflation should turn 
positive again as from the end of the year and remain 
so throughout 2010. The forecast is for it to remain at 
low levels, however, in a scenario of persistent weak-
ness in demand and deterioration of the labour market. 
According to the new Eurosystem projections, inflation 
is predicted to lie within a range between 0.9 p.c. and 
1.7 p.c. in 2010, after reaching around 0.3 p.c. on aver-
age in 2009.
2.    Activity, employment and demand
According  to  the  flash  estimate  from  the  National 
Accounts  Institute,  GDP  in  Belgium  rose  by  0.5  p.c. in 
the third quarter of 2009 after showing a decline for four 
successive quarters. Having felt the effects of the reces-
sion most intensely at the end of 2008 and beginning of 
2009, like the euro area as a whole, Belgium moved out 
of it at the same time as the latter. This parallel develop-
ment  is  the  direct  result  of  the  very  close  ties  uniting 
Belgium with its partners in the euro area, in particular 
the neighbouring countries, not only in terms of produc-
tion  and  commercial  trade  but  also  financial  relations, 
elements that played a crucial role in the crisis. The overall 
scale of the decline in GDP was historical in Belgium too, 
reaching 4.2 p.c. between the high point reported in the 
second quarter of 2008 and the low point registered one 
year later, even if this is smaller than the drop of 5.1 p.c. 
seen in the euro area between the first quarter of 2008 
and the middle of 2009.
In Belgium, the upturn in indicators of business activity 
suggests that the economy will maintain a growth path at 
the end of 2009 and in 2010. However, the rate of rise in 
Belgium is expected to remain relatively low next year as 
in the euro area, given the absence of a vigorous recovery 
in foreign demand and the predicted low levels of invest-
ment and private consumption, against a background of 
deterioration on the labour market. GDP is forecast to 
decrease by a total of 3.1 p.c. as an annual average in 
2009, before growing by 1 p.c. in 2010.
While the labour market initially demonstrated its rela-
tive resilience, with only limited job losses in view of the 
severity of the recession, this situation stems partly from 
developments  set  to  be  reversed.  Actually,  in  spite  of 
intensive use of systems allowing some flexibility in the 
use  of  the  workforce,  the  volume  of  labour  mobilised 
within firms decreased less than production at the end 
of 2008 and beginning of the current year, this abrupt 
drop giving rise to very large losses in terms of hourly 
productivity of labour. In the first half of the year, this 
latter measure declined by 2.5 p.c. compared to the cor-
responding period of the previous year over the economy 
as a whole, dragging down firms’ profitability. However, 
the trend in the volume of labour rapidly followed, gradu-
ally worsening in the course of 2009. Firms are expected 
to continue progressively rebuilding their productivity in 
2010, in a climate of limited resurgence in activity, so that, 
measured as an annual shift, the change in the volume of 
labour is not forecast to return to positive values until the 
end of the year.









Three-month interbank rates in euro  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 1.2 1.2
Ten-year bond yields in Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 3.9 4.0
Euro exchange rate against the US dollar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.47 1.39 1.49
Oil price (US dollar per barrel)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97.7 62.2 81.4
(percentage changes)
Export markets relevant to Belgium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 –10.9 3.6
Competitors’ export prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 –3.7 –0.6
Source : ECB.
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Furthermore, by allowing firms to adapt the volume of 
their staff without resorting to redundancies, the wide-
scale  introduction  of  temporary  lay-offs  for  manual 
workers  greatly  contributed  to  limiting  job  losses,  the 
average duration of work per employed person decreas-
ing by 1.5 p.c. in the first six months of 2009. As in other 
European countries, additional measures moving in the 
same  direction  were  adopted  under  the  stimulus  plan 
in 2009, notably by offering the possibility of suspend-
ing, subject to certain conditions, the implementation of 
employment contracts for clerical workers or by encour-
aging  reductions  in  working  hours.  According  to  the 
information available, the number of persons affected by 
these new systems remained low when the forecasts were 
finalised. Given the anticipated reduction in the use made 
of these different flexible systems, however, destruction 
of  jobs  should  continue  in  2010  despite  strengthening 
activity.
Overall,  while  GDP  is  forecast  to  show  growth  of  the 
order of 1 p.c. in 2010, the expectation is that the volume 
of labour will continue to decline, albeit at a lesser rate 
than in 2009, with the change falling back from –1.6 p.c. 
to  –0.3  p.c.  However,  the  annual  average  decrease  in 
employment  measured  in  persons  is  set  to  accelerate 
between these two years, climbing from –0.6 p.c. in 2009, 
a result bolstered by the rise that was still being recorded 
at the end of 2008, to –1.5 p.c. in 2010. Compared to 
the fourth quarter of 2008, 118,000 jobs are likely to be 
lost in overall terms during the two years covered by the 
projections, 74,000 of them in 2009. The number of job-
less is in turn predicted to grow by 168,000 units over the 
same period, driven by the effect of the continuing rise in 
the number of persons coming onto the labour market. 
Whereas the unemployment rate stood at an average of 
7 p.c. in 2008, it is set to climb to 7.9 p.c. in 2009 and 
9 p.c. in 2010.
The combination of a virulent financial crisis and a gener-
alised decline in activity had a major effect on households 
and firms in 2009. Except for consumption and invest-
ment in the general government sector, all the compo-
nents  of  expenditure  weighed  on  the  development  of 
GDP. The modest recovery in growth in 2010 would be 










































CHART 2  DEVELOPMENT OF GDP AND VOLUME OF LABOUR
  (seasonally adjusted data)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Calendar adjusted data.
2009 e 2010 e
Percentage changes compared to the corresponding
quarter of the previous year
Percentage changes compared to the previous quarter
Annual percentage changes
GDP in volume (1) (left-hand scale)
Overall synthetic curve (right-hand scale)
Smoothed series
Gross series




Percentage changes compared to the previous year (1)14
based on a slight strengthening of private consumption 
and exports, and a turnaround in movements of inven-
tories. However, the downturn in private investments is 
expected to continue.
In 2009, firms were faced with a synchronised collapse in 
most foreign markets such that foreign demand focused 
on  Belgium  is  estimated  to  have  deteriorated  by  more 
than 11 p.c. on average over the year as a whole. In this 
context, exports of goods and services were to contract by 
over 12 p.c., constituting the largest drop ever recorded, 
with the decline being particularly severe at the end of 
2008  and  beginning  of  2009.  The  volume  of  exports 
began to recover in April 2009 but remains weak and so 
is far from having regained the previous level. Alongside 
this, imports fell strongly, albeit at a slightly lower rate 
than that of exports. Overall, net exports would make a 
negative contribution to the change in GDP, to the tune 
of 0.6 percentage points. This contribution is expected to 
be slightly positive in 2010, in the wake of the gradual 
hardening of foreign demand.
Furthermore, faced with the prospect of a persistent dete-
rioration in demand and anxious to protect their financial 
position, Belgian firms similarly participated in the broad 
process of running down inventories seen on the world 
stage. Over the current year as a whole, this process is 
likely to cut 1.3 percentage points from the change in 
GDP. It is expected to come to an end during the second 
half  of  2009,  so  that  the  change  in  inventories  would 
make a small positive contribution to growth in 2010, of 
the order of 0.4 percentage point.
Finally, the very depressed economic environment should 
prompt firms, through the workings of a range of fac-
tors,  to  reduce  their  gross  fixed  capital  formation.  In 
the  first  place,  the  recent  fall  in  production  gave  rise 
to an unprecedented drop in the degree of production 
capacity  utilisation.  According  to  the  Bank’s  quarterly 
survey, this fell back from 82.4 p.c. in October 2008 to 
a historical low of 70.1 p.c. in April 2009. The degree of 
capacity utilisation increased slightly in the subsequent 
period,  reaching  73.1  p.c.  in  October,  but  it  remains 
substantially below the average level of the last thirty 
years, and the modest demand prospects do not point 
to a rapid rebound. Furthermore, the recession is fore-
cast to weigh heavily on firms’ operational profitability 
in 2009, due to the substantial decrease both in sales 
volume and productivity. By pushing up unit labour costs 
by  a  considerable  amount,  such  a  drop  in  productiv-
ity tends to reduce firms’ margins in a scenario where 
selling prices are still under pressure, notably in foreign 
markets. However, this effect is largely offset by the fall 
in  the  price  of  imported  inputs.  Moreover,  despite  an 
improvement in the course of the year, real conditions 
for external borrowing are still affected by the financial 
crisis.  According  to  the  projections,  business  invest-
ments are set to decline by a total of 5.8 p.c. in 2009 
and 1.6 p.c. in 2010, whereas they had been rising at a 
steady rate during the previous years.






































CHART 3  EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
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Private  individuals  are  also  expected  to  rein  in  their 
expenditure strongly in 2009, both regarding household 
consumption and investment in housing. This behaviour 
mainly indicates a high level of caution in the face of 
uncertain  prospects  with  regard  to  employment  and 
future income, since their disposable income is set to 
increase  steadily  again  –  by  2.1  p.c.  –  in  real  terms. 
However, this improvement in purchasing power largely 
results from the interplay of two temporary factors. On 
the one hand, the effect of indexation on wages this 
year is set to be considerably greater than inflation in 
consumer prices given that, due to the time-lags incor-
porated in the mechanisms in the various sectors, part 
of  the  high  inflation  recorded  in  2008  is  reflected  in 
salaries in 2009, and that the rise in the health index, 
which is used as a reference for indexation, is greater 
than the overall level of inflation this year. On the other 
hand, households are benefiting from reductions in tax 
in 2009, especially those located in Flanders, and from 
the  fast-tracking  of  personal  income  tax  assessments. 
This traditionally gives rise, on balance, to payments of 
refunds to taxpayers by the fiscal authorities. These fac-
tors will no longer play a part in 2010. On the contrary, 
the Flemish government has decided to limit tax reduc-
tions,  while  earned  incomes  will  be  affected  by  the 
decrease  in  employment  and  the  modest  progress  in 
salaries. Thus, disposable income is forecast to decline 
by 1 p.c. in 2010.
These short-term movements in disposable income are 
hardly reflected at all in the trend for private consump-
tion. In fact, in a climate of great uncertainty and sub-
stantial losses in value on their financial assets, private 
individuals  strongly  reined  in  their  consumption  and 
increased their savings at the end of 2008 and begin-
ning of 2009. The upturn in confidence among house-
holds which began in April 2009, notably with regard 
to general economic prospects and the situation on the 
labour  market,  should  give  rise  to  a  progressive,  but 
limited, strengthening of consumption. In total, private 
consumption is expected to decline by 1.6 p.c. in real 
terms in 2009, before increasing by 0.8 p.c. in 2010. 
At the same time, the savings ratio is forecast to rise by 
around 3 percentage points in the first year, rising from 
16.6 p.c. of disposable income in 2008 to 19.7 p.c. in 
2009, before falling back to 18.4 p.c. in 2010. Likewise, 
Table  3	 GDP,	emPloyment	anD	main	cateGories	of	exPenDiture










GDP  (1)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 0.8 –3.1 1.0
Total domestic employment in persons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.9 –0.6 –1.5
Total volume of labour  (2)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 1.3 –1.6 –0.3
Real disposable income  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 1.3 2.1 –1.0
  Components of expenditure  (1)
Final consumption expenditure of individuals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.0 –1.6 0.8
Final consumption expenditure of general government   . . . . . . . . 2.6 3.3 2.2 1.1
Gross fixed capital formation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 3.8 –4.1 –1.3
Housing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.8 –1.6 –2.7 –1.9
Government  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.4 7.6 2.6
Business  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 6.1 –5.8 –1.6
p.m. Domestic expenditure excluding change in inventories   (3)   . .   2.6   2.1   –1.2   0.4
Change in inventories  (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.2 –1.3 0.4
Net exports of goods and services  (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 –1.0 –0.6 0.2
Exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 1.4 –12.1 3.0
Imports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.7 –11.5 2.7
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  In volume.
(2)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(3)  Contribution to the change in GDP.
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private individuals are set to reduce their spending on 
investments in housing, by 2.7 p.c. in 2009 and 1.9 p.c. 
in 2010.
3.    Prices and costs
Inflation slowed down markedly in Belgium in the course 
of  2009,  just  as  in  the  euro  area ;  it  even  went  into 
negative territory from May onwards, and appears to have 
remained so up to November. At its most intense in July, 
the fall in the index reached 1.7 p.c. compared to the pre-
vious year. However, this period of disinflation is forecast 
to be short-lived. Far from being a general phenomenon, 
it stems almost exclusively from the considerable decrease 
in the level of energy prices compared to the situation 
prevailing  a  year  earlier,  when  the  price  of  oil  on  the 
international markets had reached a peak of more than 
140 US dollars per barrel. This fell back to only 40 US dol-
lars at the end of 2008, but the price has virtually doubled 
since then and according to the assumptions adopted for 
the current forecasts, it is projected to rise further in 2010. 
From then on, the underlying negative effects which influ-
enced the development of energy prices for a large part 
of 2009 will rapidly reverse.
The profile of the “energy” component is therefore the 
main  explanation  for  the  marked  slowdown  in  overall 
inflation, from an average of 4.5 p.c. in 2008 to 0 p.c. in 
2009, just as it accounts for a large part of its anticipated 
rise in 2010, to a rate of 1.6 p.c. The health index, in turn, 
is forecast to rise by 0.6 p.c. in 2009 and 1.1 p.c. in 2010.
Food prices also contribute to this V-shaped movement in 
overall inflation, since they have, as it were, stabilised in 
the course of 2009 after increasing very sharply in 2008. 
The expectation is that they will return to a normal rate of 
rise in 2010. On the other hand, the slowdown in inflation 
that started in 2009 for non-energy industrial goods and 
services, that is to say the two main components of the 
HICP, is set to continue in 2010. This effect follows from 
an easing of inflationary pressures due to the generally 
low level of demand, through the import price mechanism 
and, in 2010, labour costs. Following a rise of 6.6 p.c. 
in 2008, the deflator for imports is forecast to decrease 
by more than 7 p.c. in 2009 against the backdrop of an 
appreciating  euro,  declining  raw  materials  prices  and 
sluggishness in global trade, before growing slightly by 
1.1 p.c. in 2010. For their part, unit labour costs in the 
private sector are estimated to have risen again steadily 
by 4.4 p.c. in 2009, before declining by 1.1 p.c. in 2010.





















































CHART 4  INFLATION
  (HICP, percentage changes compared to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Sources : EC, NBB.
(1)  Impact on overall inflation, in percentage points, of price changes connected with measures concerning the radio and television licence fee and changes to network industry 
tariffs.17
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The strong increase in unit labour costs in 2009 and their 
marked  slowdown  the  following  year  both  result  to  a 
large extent from the status of labour productivity at each 
point in the business cycle. As explained above, and to an 
even greater extent than in 2008, when growth in activity 
had already slowed down markedly, the abrupt contrac-
tion in production in 2009 was only partly reflected in 
the volume of labour. The adjustment in the latter is set 
to continue again on a large scale in 2010, so that pro-
ductivity per hour worked is expected to improve again, 
by 1.6 p.c., after dipping by 0.6 p.c. in 2008 and 1.5 p.c. 
in 2009.
The  rise  in  hourly  labour  costs  in  the  private  sector  is 
predicted to fall back from 2.8 p.c. in 2009 to 0.5 p.c. 
in 2010. This development essentially corresponds to the 
anticipated effect of indexation, the latter reacting with 
some lag to the hike in inflation measured by the health 
index in 2008, and then its slowdown in 2009. Moreover, 
a limited rise in real terms has been taken into account, in 
line with the provisions of the central agreement, which 
provide for the option of granting non-recurring bonuses 
of 125 euro in 2009 and 250 euro in 2010.
4.    Public finances
According to the latest information, public finances are 
expected to end 2009 with a deficit of 6.1 p.c. of GDP. In 
the macroeconomic context described above, this deficit 
would shrink in 2010, reaching 5.4 p.c. of GDP.
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, public revenues are 
projected to decline by 1.1 percentage points in 2009 
and rise by 0.6 percentage points in 2010. The fallout 
from  the  economic  and  financial  crisis  is  particularly 
visible  in  terms  of  company  taxation,  the  proceeds 
of  which  are  set  to  fall  in  2009  by  close  to  one-third 
compared  to  the  previous  year.  Revenue  originating 
from registration fees and advance tax on income from 
securities is similarly projected to show a net downturn. 
Conversely, the tax take on earned incomes is likely to 
remain virtually unchanged this year with reference to 
GDP. It is true that revenues are being weighed down 
by  a  certain  number  of  structural  measures  passed  by 
the federal government with regard to personal income 
tax as well as the increased amount of the tax reduction 
granted by the Flemish Region. To this is added the fact 
that  the  federal  government  has  speeded  up  personal 
tax  assessments,  a  measure  which  has  considerably 
increased tax refunds to households. However, the effect 
of these factors is projected to be cancelled out by the 
sharp increase in the share of earned incomes in GDP, 
which are subject to relatively heavy fiscal pressure. In 
2010, fiscal and parafiscal revenues should once again 
show a rise due to the disappearance of the negative 
effect caused by the fast-tracking of assessments in 2009 
referred to above. Moreover, several measures are having 
a favourable influence on revenues. This applies to the 
tax reduction approved by the Flemish Region, the scope 
of which will be reduced, and the tax take on company 
profits, which will increase following a restriction being 
placed on deductible expenses. For their part, non-fiscal 
and  non-parafiscal  revenues  are  projected  to  rise  by 
0.2 p.c. of GDP in 2009 and also in 2010 by virtue of 
payments  made  by  financial  institutions  following  the 
financial crisis.
Primary  expenditure,  which  came  to  46.2  p.c.  of  GDP 
in  2008,  should  grow  to  50.1  p.c.  of  GDP  in  2009, 
thus  reaching  a  level  not  seen  since  the  beginning  of 
the  1980s.  This  increase  stems  from  the  concerted 
Table  4	 Price	and	cost	indicators










Total HICP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.5 0.0 1.6
Energy products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 19.8 –13.8 5.9
Total excluding energy products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 2.7 1.9 1.0
GDP deflator   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.9
Labour costs in the private sector :
Unit labour costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 4.0 4.4 –1.1
Hourly labour costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.3 2.8 0.5
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB.
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influence  of  three  factors,  namely  the  contraction  in 
GDP,  a  considerable  rise  in  spending  on  social  security 
and non-  recurring expenditure resulting from two legal 
judgements awarded against the Belgian State due to tax 
collected improperly in the past : on the one hand, from 
certain companies receiving dividends of foreign subsidi-
aries, and, on the other hand, from married unemployed 
workers. In 2010, primary expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP is set to nearly   stabilise. Real structural growth in the 
former is once again set to be greater than the upward 
trend in GDP, but this effect is likely to be cancelled out by 
the disappearance of those sums paid out in implementa-
tion of the judgements awarded against the Belgian State 
in 2009.
Interest  charges  are  expected  to  remain  unchanged 
overall for the entire duration of the period covered by 
the  projections,  due  to  the  low  level  of  interest  rates. 
Admittedly,  public  debt  should  increase,  but  the  effect 
of this rise on interest charges is expected to be almost 
completely offset by the decrease in the implicit interest 
rate of the public debt.
The borrowing requirement thus estimated at 5.4 p.c. of 
GDP in 2010 is more favourable than predicted by the 
federal government (5.6 p.c. of GDP). On the one hand, 
the budget for general government assumes a scenario 
where economic growth will amount to 0.4 p.c. in 2010, 
whereas  the  current  projections  are  based  on  it  reach-
ing 1 p.c. On the other hand, the federal government is 
proceeding on the assumption that the Communities and 
Regions will show a deficit of 1.1 p.c. of GDP in 2010, 
while the Bank’s projections, which take account of the 
Communities’  and  Regions’  budgets,  forecast  that  this 
deficit will amount to 0.9 p.c. of GDP.
The downward trend in the debt ratio of general govern-
ment, which has been recorded since 1993, was suddenly 
interrupted in 2008. During that year in fact, the debt 
ratio grew strongly due to loans taken out by the Belgian 
government  in  order  to  come  to  the  aid  of  financial 
institutions, notably in the form of injections of capital 
and loans. It is projected to increase considerably in 2009 
under the combined effect of the contraction in nominal 
GDP and the net growth in borrowing requirement. In 
2010, public debt would continue to expand, being pro-
jected to reach a level greater than GDP again.
5.      Assessment of the risk factors
In Belgium as in the majority of the advanced economies, 
the recovery in activity which began in mid-2009 arrived 
earlier  than  was  anticipated  six  months  ago,  against  a 
backdrop of easing financial tensions, particularly accom-
modative economic policies and improving business and 
household confidence. From then on, the estimated scale 
of the fall in GDP for 2009 was a little less than in the 
Bank’s previous forecasting exercise published in June and 
the projections currently refer to growth of 1 p.c. in 2010, 
while they previously foresaw a slight decrease.
There are grounds for hoping that this recovery will be 
maintained, or that it will pick up pace over the course 
of the next few quarters. However, several factors taken 
into account by the majority of forecasters indicate the 











Revenues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.2 48.8 47.7 48.4
Fiscal and parafiscal revenues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.3 43.7 42.5 42.9
Others  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.4
Primary expenditure   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.5 46.2 50.1 50.1
Primary balance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.6 –2.4 –1.7
Interest charges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7
Financing requirement (–) or capacity   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.2 –1.2 –6.1 –5.4
p.m.	Effect	of	non-recurrent	factors	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   –0.1   0.0   –0.8   0.0
Consolidated gross debt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.2 89.8 98.1 102.0
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure.
 19
economic projections for Belgium – Autumn 2009
need for caution since, even if it appears to be over, the 
effects of the recession will be seen for a long time to 
come.
On  the  one  hand,  having  benefited  from  emergency 
measures aimed at preventing a systemic collapse, finan-
cial institutions need to pursue their reorganisation, which 
will allow them to get back on a firm footing with a view 
to safeguarding their role of financing the economy. This 
kind of reorganisation is a difficult exercise, particularly in 
a weakened economic situation.
On the other hand, the massive stimulus measures taken 
by monetary authorities and governments were crucial in 
preventing  the  global  economy  from  becoming  locked 
into a scenario of depression. Nonetheless, these interven-
tions cannot continue for long or they risk endangering 
the conditions for long-term development. The pace and 
timetable  of  exit  strategies  from  these  flexible  budget-
ary  and  monetary  policies  are  particularly  difficult  to 
determine, since there is a simultaneous need to ensure 
short-term support for demand and prepare the economy 
for structural challenges over the long term.
Therefore,  beyond  the  cyclical  turnaround  in  invento-
ries, a sustainable economic recovery would need to be 
supported  by  endogenous  engines  of  growth,  such  as 
investment  and  private  consumption.  Prospects  remain 
dogged by a high level of uncertainty in this respect too. 
The large amount of surplus production capacity around 
the world resulting from the contraction in activity should 
persist and therefore continue to weigh on investment 
and employment.
These elements have been taken into account in the pro-
jections. Nonetheless, in view of the exceptional nature of 
the current situation, arriving at a precise assessment of 
the extent to which they will unfold is not easy. The fore-
casts for 2010 are therefore surrounded by a high degree 
of uncertainty.
Table  6	 Comparison	of	the	foreCasts	for	Belgium






















NBB – Autumn 2009   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.1 1.0 0.0 1.6 –6.1 –5.4 December 2009
p.m.	Spring	2009	  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   –3.5   –0.2   0.1   1.3   –5.5   –6.0 June	2009
NAI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.1 0.4 0.0 1.5 n. n. September 2009
IMF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.2 0.0 0.2 1.0 –5.9 –6.3 October 2009
EC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –2.9 0.6 0.0 1.3 –5.9 –5.8 November 2009
OECD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.1 0.8 –0.1 1.0 –5.7 –5.6 November 2009
p.m.	Actual	2008	  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   0.8   4.5   –1.2
(1)  HICP, except for NAI : national consumer price index.
(2)  Percentages of GDP.
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Annex
Projections for the Belgian economy : summary of the main results












  growth (calendar adjusted data)
GDP in volume  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 2.8 0.8 –3.1 1.0
Contributions to growth :
Domestic expenditure, excluding change in inventories   . . . . . . 1.7 2.6 2.1 –1.2 0.4
Net exports of goods and services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.2 –1.0 –0.6 0.2
Change in inventories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.1 –0.2 –1.3 0.4
  Prices and costs
Harmonised index of consumer prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.8 4.5 0.0 1.6
Health index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 1.8 4.2 0.6 1.1
GDP deflator   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.3 1.8 1.1 0.9
Terms of trade  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.7 0.3 –2.2 2.4 0.5
Unit labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 2.2 4.0 4.4 –1.1
Hourly labour costs in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 3.4 3.3 2.8 0.5
Hourly productivity in the private sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 1.2 –0.6 –1.5 1.6
  labour market
Domestic employment  
(average annual change in thousands of persons)  . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.5 70.3 82.1 –27.3 –64.4
Total volume of labour  (1)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 1.9 1.3 –1.6 –0.3
Harmonised unemployment rate  (2) (p.c. of the labour force)  . . . 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.9 9.0
  incomes
Real disposable income of individuals   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 2.0 1.3 2.1 –1.0
Savings ratio of individuals (p.c. of disposable income)  . . . . . . . . 15.8 16.2 16.6 19.7 18.4
  Public finances  (3)
Overall balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.2 –1.2 –6.1 –5.4
Primary balance (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 3.6 2.6 –2.4 –1.7
Public debt (p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.1 84.2 89.8 98.1 102.0
  current account 
  (according to the balance of payments, p.c. of GDP)  . . . . . . . . .   2.0   2.2   –2.5   –0.9   –0.4
Sources : EC, DGSEI, NAI, NBB.
(1)  Total number of hours worked in the economy.
(2)  Adjusted series (Eurostat).
(3)  According to the methodology used in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
 